University of Toronto · Rotman School of Management · Winter 2026
Fundamentals of Accounting & Finance
Final Examination Review — Winter 2026
Examiner: Professor Kevin Mott
Section 0
When & Where
Aids & Rules
Strategy for 150 minutes: The practice final has 6 multi-part questions matching the topic breakdown below. Budget roughly 25 minutes per major question. Read every question first, attack the ones you're most confident on early, and always show your formula setup — partial credit is generous when you demonstrate the right approach even if arithmetic slips.
Six Practice-Final Topics (likely exam structure)
Section I
Finance is the study of managing cash flows across time, space, and risk. This course focuses on time and risk. The interest rate is the exchange rate across time — it lets us convert $100 today into $110 next year (at r=10%) or vice versa. The opportunity cost of using money today is forgoing the return you could have earned by investing it.
| Pattern | Cash flows | Present Value |
|---|---|---|
| Perpetuity | $C$ forever starting at $t=1$ | $\text{PV} = \dfrac{C}{r}$ |
| Growing perpetuity | $C, C(1+g), C(1+g)^2, \ldots$ forever | $\text{PV} = \dfrac{C}{r-g}$, requires $r>g$ |
| Annuity | $C$ each period for $T$ periods | $\text{PV} = \dfrac{C}{r}\left[1 - \dfrac{1}{(1+r)^T}\right]$ |
| Growing annuity | $C, C(1+g), \ldots, C(1+g)^{T-1}$ | $\text{PV} = \dfrac{C}{r-g}\left[1 - \left(\dfrac{1+g}{1+r}\right)^T\right]$ |
IRR is the discount rate that makes $\text{NPV} = 0$. It's a direct generalization of the one-period return to multiple cash flows. For a one-time outflow followed by inflows:
IRR decision rule: Accept if $\text{IRR} > $ opportunity cost; reject if $\text{IRR} < $ opportunity cost. For conventional projects (one sign change in cash flows), NPV and IRR rules always agree.
Asset pricing principle: In competitive markets, price = present value of future cash flows. Buyer and seller agree at the price where NPV = 0 for both parties. This is the foundation of all valuation.
Section II
A stock's price today equals the present value of all future dividends:
Case 1 — Constant dividends (perpetuity): $P_0 = D/r$ — used for mature utility-like companies.
Case 2 — Gordon Growth Model (constant growth $g < r$):
Case 3 — Multi-stage growth: Break into high-growth phase (growing annuity years $1..T$) plus stable-growth phase (growing perpetuity from $T+1$ onward, discounted back to today):
A bond's cash flows: coupon payments $C$ each period (annuity) plus face value $F$ at maturity (lump sum). Price is the sum of their PVs:
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Face / par value (F) | Principal repaid at maturity; fixed when issued (typically $1,000) |
| Coupon payment (C) | Periodic interest payment; fixed at issuance |
| Coupon rate (c) | C / F, the contractual interest rate on face value |
| Maturity (T) | Years until final payment |
| Yield to maturity (YTM) | Discount rate r making PV of cash flows = price. YTM = IRR of the bond. |
| Price (P) | Market value today; fluctuates with market conditions |
| Relationship | Bond type | Price vs Face |
|---|---|---|
| YTM > coupon rate | Discount | P < F |
| YTM = coupon rate | Par | P = F |
| YTM < coupon rate | Premium | P > F |
Logic: When YTM > coupon rate, the bond pays too little relative to market rates, so its price drops below face to compensate. When YTM < coupon rate, the bond pays more than market rates, so investors bid up the price above face.
Critical convention for the exam: Bond yields and coupons are quoted as semi-annual APRs. A 22-year bond with yield 5% and coupon 7.35% means: semi-annual yield = 2.5%, semi-annual coupon = 3.675% × $1,000 = $36.75 per 6-month period, with T = 44 semi-annual periods.
Semi-annual yield $r = 5\%/2 = 2.5\% = 0.025$. Semi-annual coupon $C = (0.0735/2)\cdot 1000 = \$36.75$. Periods $T = 22 \cdot 2 = 44$.
$$\text{PV}_{\text{coupons}} = \frac{36.75}{0.025}\left[1 - \frac{1}{(1.025)^{44}}\right] = 1470 \cdot 0.6635 = \$975.30$$
$$\text{PV}_{\text{face}} = \frac{1000}{(1.025)^{44}} = \$336.54$$
$P = \$975.30 + \$336.54 \approx \$1{,}311.84$ (premium bond, since YTM $<$ coupon rate).
British consols pay a fixed coupon forever. $\text{Value} = C/r$. If the consol pays \$40 every 6 months and yield is 5% (semi-annual APR), semi-annual rate $= 2.5\%$: $P = 40/0.025 = \$1{,}600$.
Section III
APR (Annual Percentage Rate) $=$ rate per period $\times$ periods per year. APR is just a quoting convention — it does not capture the effect of compounding frequency. Two 18% APRs can mean different actual costs depending on whether they compound monthly, daily, etc.
where $m$ = compounding periods per year. EAR puts all rates on a common annual-compounded benchmark so they can be compared directly.
Continuous compounding: As $m \to \infty$, $\text{FV} = \text{PV}\cdot e^{rt}$. Used in theoretical finance and Black-Scholes.
Lease: \$15,000 loan, 1% monthly (compounded monthly), 36 monthly payments.
$$\text{EAR}_{\text{lease}} = (1 + 0.01)^{12} - 1 \approx 12.68\%$$
Solve annuity for $C$: $\quad 15{,}000 = \dfrac{C}{0.01}\left[1 - \dfrac{1}{(1.01)^{36}}\right] = C\cdot 30.1075 \implies \boxed{C \approx \$498.21}$
Buy: \$25,000 loan, 4% APR compounded monthly, 60 monthly payments.
Monthly rate $= 0.04/12 \approx 0.333\%$, $\quad \text{EAR}_{\text{buy}} = \left(1 + \tfrac{0.04}{12}\right)^{12} - 1 \approx 4.07\%$
$$25{,}000 = \frac{C}{0.00333}\left[1 - \frac{1}{(1.00333)^{60}}\right] \implies \boxed{C \approx \$460.41}$$
Answer: The lease quotes 1%/month, which sounds lower than 4%/year, but its actual EAR is 12.68% — three times the buy's 4.07% EAR. The dealership used the period rate (monthly) to make the lease look cheap; the buy loan is far cheaper. Mott was mad the dealer tried to trick him with misleading rate comparisons.
Section IV
For a portfolio with weights $\mathbf{w}$:
Key insight: Total Risk = Systematic Risk + Diversifiable Risk. Diversifiable (firm-specific/idiosyncratic) risk can be eliminated for free by holding many assets. Systematic (market) risk affects all firms simultaneously and cannot be diversified away.
Only systematic risk earns a risk premium — rational investors won't demand extra return for bearing diversifiable risk, because it's free to eliminate. This motivates CAPM.
Measures excess return per unit of total risk. The market portfolio maximizes the Sharpe ratio; combining it with the risk-free asset gives the Capital Allocation Line.
Section V
Only systematic risk (measured by $\beta$) is compensated.
Estimating beta: regress $R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{m,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$. The slope is $\beta$; the intercept $\alpha$ measures mispricing (positive alpha $=$ underpriced, negative alpha $=$ overpriced).
Fig. 1 — The SML plots expected return against beta. Equilibrium assets lie on the line.
Every asset should lie on the SML in equilibrium. Assets above the line (α>0) are underpriced; below (α<0) are overpriced. Arbitrage forces prices back onto the line.
Fig. 2 — Using firm-wide beta leads to false negatives (low-risk projects rejected) and false positives (high-risk projects accepted).
Key insight: You must use the project's beta, not the firm's overall beta, when evaluating capital projects. A conglomerate with $\beta_{\text{firm}} = 1.3$ evaluating a low-risk utility project with $\beta_{\text{project}} = 0.6$ should use the lower hurdle rate. Using the firm's rate systematically rejects positive-NPV low-risk projects and accepts negative-NPV high-risk projects.
Accept the project if $\text{IRR} > \text{Hurdle}$ (equivalently, $\text{NPV} > 0$ at that discount rate).
Company: $r_{\text{hist}} = 4\%$, $r_f = 3\%$, MRP $= 6\%$, firm $\beta = 1$. Timber project: $\beta_{\text{proj}} = 1.75$ (175% as volatile as market). Cash flows: $-\$10\text{M}, +\$2.75\text{M}, +\$4.5\text{M}, +\$5\text{M}$.
Part (a) — wrong approach (historical return 4%):
$$\text{NPV} = -10 + \frac{2.75}{1.04} + \frac{4.5}{1.04^2} + \frac{5}{1.04^3} \approx +\$1.25\text{M} > 0$$
Looks good, but historical 4% isn't a proper hurdle rate.
Part (b) — CAPM with firm beta:
$$r_{\text{firm}} = 3\% + 1 \cdot 6\% = 9\%$$
$$\text{NPV} = -10 + \frac{2.75}{1.09} + \frac{4.5}{1.09^2} + \frac{5}{1.09^3} \approx +\$0.17\text{M} > 0$$
Still positive, but this uses the wrong beta.
Part (c) — CAPM with project beta (correct):
$$r_{\text{proj}} = 3\% + 1.75 \cdot 6\% = 13.5\%$$
$$\text{NPV} = -10 + \frac{2.75}{1.135} + \frac{4.5}{1.135^2} + \frac{5}{1.135^3} \approx -\$0.66\text{M} < 0 \implies \textbf{REJECT}$$
Lesson: Using the wrong discount rate would have led the firm to accept a value-destroying project. Systematic risk must be measured at the project level; historical returns mix firm-specific shocks and can reflect a different risk profile from today.
The Fama-French 3-factor model extends CAPM with size (SMB) and value (HML) factors:
Multifactor models fit the cross-section of returns better empirically, but CAPM remains the workhorse for corporate finance applications because of its simplicity. The unifying principle: only systematic risk earns a premium, however many dimensions it has.
Section VI
After-tax cost of debt: $r_D(1 - \tau_c)$. Interest is tax-deductible, so every \$1 of interest reduces taxes by $\tau_c$ dollars.
Weights use market values, not book values. WACC is the hurdle rate for projects that match the firm's average systematic risk.
Firm: $E = \$600\text{M}$, $D = \$400\text{M}$, $r_E = 12\%$, $r_D = 5\%$, $\tau_c = 25\%$.
$$\text{WACC} = (0.6)(12\%) + (0.4)(5\%)(1 - 0.25) = 7.2\% + 1.5\% = \boxed{8.7\%}$$
Section VII
In a frictionless world (no taxes, no bankruptcy costs), capital structure is irrelevant to firm value. WACC is constant regardless of leverage. Why? As debt rises (cheaper), equity becomes riskier (more expensive) and the two effects cancel exactly.
If debt is risk-free $(\beta_D = 0)$: $\beta_E = \beta_{\text{Project}}(1 + D/E)$. More leverage $\Rightarrow$ higher equity beta.
$r_0 = $ unlevered cost of equity (return if firm had no debt). The leverage premium compensates equity holders for bearing amplified systematic risk.
Each dollar of debt reduces WACC because interest is tax-deductible. Lower WACC → higher firm value and more positive-NPV projects.
Fig. 3 — With taxes: $r_E$ rises linearly, WACC falls with leverage until bankruptcy costs dominate.
Direct costs: legal, accounting, court fees (3-7% of firm value). Indirect costs: lost customers, suppliers demanding cash, talented employees leaving, underinvestment in good projects, fire-sale asset disposals.
Fig. 4 — Trade-off theory: tax shield lowers WACC at low leverage, bankruptcy costs dominate at high leverage. The minimum of WACC is the optimal capital structure.
High-β firms (cyclical revenues, airlines) should use less debt. Stable-cash-flow firms (utilities) can safely take on more.
Given: $r_0 = 10\%$, $E = \$1{,}000\text{M}$, $r_D = 5\%$, $\tau_c = 20\%$, $\text{EBIT} = \$100\text{M}/\text{year}$.
(a) $D = \$0$ (all equity):
Interest $= 0 \to$ Taxable $= \$100\text{M} \to$ Tax $= \$20\text{M} \to$ Post-tax $= \boxed{\$80\text{M}}$
(b) $D = \$1{,}000\text{M}$:
Interest $= 0.05 \cdot 1000 = \$50\text{M} \to$ Taxable $= \$50\text{M} \to$ Tax $= \$10\text{M} \to$ Post-tax $= \boxed{\$40\text{M}}$
Tax savings: $\$20\text{M} - \$10\text{M} = \$10\text{M}$ (the tax shield $= \tau_c \cdot I = 0.20 \cdot 50$).
(c) Maximum debt: EBIT must cover interest, so $D_{\max} = \dfrac{\$100\text{M}}{0.05} = \$2{,}000\text{M}$.
Interest $= \$100\text{M} \to$ Taxable $= 0 \to$ Tax $= 0 \to$ Post-tax $= \$0$. All income flows to debtholders.
(d) Cost of equity and WACC at each level:
$D = 0$: $\;D/E = 0, \; r_E = 10\%, \; \text{WACC} = 10\%$
$D = 1000$: $\;D/E = 1, \; r_E = 10\% + 1\cdot(10\%-5\%)\cdot 0.8 = 14\%, \; \text{WACC} = 10\%\cdot[1 - (1000/2000)\cdot 0.2] = 9.0\%$
$D = 2000$: $\;D/E \to \infty, \; r_E$ undefined analytically, $\; \text{WACC} = 10\%\cdot[1 - (2000/3000)\cdot 0.2] = 8.67\%$
Pattern: as $D/E$ rises, $r_E$ rises linearly but WACC falls because of the tax shield.
(e) Optimal in this model $=$ maximum debt. Firms minimize WACC to maximize firm value $V = \sum \text{CF}/(1+\text{WACC})^t$. Not practical: ignores bankruptcy costs. Trade-off theory balances tax shield against distress costs.
Section VIII
When a central bank (Bank of Canada, Fed, ECB) raises its policy rate:
This is the real channel of monetary policy: the central bank affects the real economy through its effect on the cost of capital and investment decisions.
Central banks hit their policy rate target by buying/selling government bonds. Buying injects reserves (lowers rate); selling drains reserves (raises rate).
Higher $\tau_c$ acts as an automatic stabilizer on equity markets: the $(1 - \tau_c)$ term in $\beta_E$ dampens the leverage effect on systematic risk. Countries with higher corporate tax rates (Canada vs US) tend to have lower equity market volatility for this reason.
Section IX
A call gives the right (not obligation) to buy at strike $K$ at expiration $T$: payoff $= \max(S_T - K, 0)$. A put gives the right to sell at $K$: payoff $= \max(K - S_T, 0)$.
Airlines use call options on oil to lock in a ceiling on fuel costs. If oil spikes above strike, airline exercises; if oil falls, airline lets option expire (losing only the premium). Asymmetric payoff = insurance against adverse moves.
Why not hedge by buying oil company stock? (i) stocks have systematic risk that moves with the market, adding unwanted beta exposure; (ii) bilateral risk — if oil falls, stock also falls, so you lose twice; (iii) oil stock returns are imperfectly correlated with oil prices.
Consider two portfolios with the same expiration $T$ and strike $K$:
Both have identical payoffs $= \max(S_T, K)$ in every state. By law of one price:
This lets us synthesize any one security from the other three. If the relationship breaks, arbitrage is possible.
Section X
We don't estimate expected payoffs and apply a risk-adjusted discount rate. Instead, we construct a portfolio of stock and bond that has identical payoffs to the option in every possible state. By law of one price, the option must cost the same as the replicating portfolio. No assumptions about probabilities, risk preferences, or expected returns are needed.
Stock at $S_0$ goes to $S_u$ (up) or $S_d$ (down) at time $T$. Call has payoffs $C_u = \max(S_u - K, 0)$ and $C_d = \max(S_d - K, 0)$.
Step 1 — Riskless portfolio (long $\Delta$ shares, short 1 call). Set payoffs equal in both states:
Step 2 — Price the riskless portfolio. Since it pays the same in every state, discount at $r_f$:
Solve for $C_0$.
Under the risk-neutral measure $q$, stocks grow at the risk-free rate in expectation. $q$ is not the real probability; it's a pricing construct that makes no-arbitrage pricing work by discounting at $r_f$.
$S_0 = \$50$, each period the stock moves $\pm 20\%$, $r = 3\%$ continuous, $K = \$45$, $T = 2$ years.
Year-2 stock: $S_{uu} = 72,\;S_{ud} = 48,\;S_{dd} = 32$. Year-1: $S_u = 60,\;S_d = 40$.
(a) Year-2 call payoffs:
$C_{uu} = \max(72 - 45, 0) = \$27,\quad C_{ud} = \max(48-45,0) = \$3,\quad C_{dd} = \max(32-45,0) = \$0$
(b) Up state at $t=1$ ($S = 60 \to 72$ or $48$):
$$q_u = \frac{e^{0.03}\cdot 60 - 48}{72 - 48} = \frac{61.827 - 48}{24} = 0.5761$$
$$C_u = e^{-0.03}\bigl[0.5761\cdot 27 + 0.4239\cdot 3\bigr] = 0.9704\cdot 16.826 \approx \boxed{\$16.33}$$
(c) Down state at $t=1$ ($S = 40 \to 48$ or $32$):
$$q_d = \frac{e^{0.03}\cdot 40 - 32}{48 - 32} = \frac{41.218 - 32}{16} = 0.5761$$
$$C_d = e^{-0.03}\bigl[0.5761\cdot 3 + 0.4239\cdot 0\bigr] = 0.9704\cdot 1.728 \approx \boxed{\$1.68}$$
(d) Collapsed tree, $t = 0$:
$$q_0 = \frac{e^{0.03}\cdot 50 - 40}{60 - 40} = \frac{51.523 - 40}{20} = 0.5761$$
$$C_0 = e^{-0.03}\bigl[0.5761\cdot 16.33 + 0.4239\cdot 1.68\bigr] = 0.9704\cdot 10.119 \approx \boxed{\$9.82}$$
Why is $q$ the same at every node? Because $u$ and $d$ factors are constant at $\pm 20\%$, the risk-neutral probability depends only on $u, d, r\Delta t$ — not on the current stock price.
Section XI
Five inputs: $S_0$ (stock price), $K$ (strike), $T$ (time to expiration), $\sigma$ (volatility), $r$ (risk-free rate, continuous). $N(\cdot)$ is the standard normal CDF.
Assumptions: constant volatility, log-normal stock prices, no dividends, continuous trading with no transaction costs, no arbitrage, constant $r_f$, European exercise only.
| Greek | Measures | Intuition |
|---|---|---|
| Delta $\;\Delta = \dfrac{\partial C}{\partial S}$ | Sensitivity to stock price | Hedge ratio; call: $[0,1]$, put: $[-1,0]$. Roughly $= $ prob. of finishing ITM |
| Gamma $\;\Gamma = \dfrac{\partial^2 C}{\partial S^2}$ | How fast $\Delta$ changes | Highest for ATM near expiry; always positive for long positions |
| Vega $\;\nu = \dfrac{\partial C}{\partial \sigma}$ | Sensitivity to volatility | Always positive; larger $\sigma \Rightarrow$ higher option value |
| Theta $\;\Theta = \dfrac{\partial C}{\partial T}$ | Time decay | Negative for long calls/puts; accelerates near expiration |
| Rho $\;\rho = \dfrac{\partial C}{\partial r}$ | Sensitivity to interest rate | Positive for calls, negative for puts |
Section XII
Traditional DCF assumes a fixed plan; real options capture the value of managerial discretion.
Real options are most valuable when uncertainty is high, there's flexibility, and investment is staged.
Call options granted to employees as compensation. Complications vs market options:
These complications reduce the employee's value below Black-Scholes: typically $C_{\text{ESO}} = 50\text{-}70\%$ of $C_{\text{BS}}$. Standard haircut is 30–50% reduction. However, the company records the full Black-Scholes value as the accounting cost of granting the options.
You're 25, working $T = 40$ years, $r = 5\%$, $r_f = 2\%$.
Company A: salary \$125K, growth 2.5%/year — a growing annuity for 40 years.
$$\text{PV}_A = \frac{125{,}000}{0.05 - 0.025}\left[1 - \left(\frac{1.025}{1.05}\right)^{40}\right] = 5{,}000{,}000 \cdot 0.6131 \approx \boxed{\$3.07\text{M}}$$
Company B base salary: \$95K, growth 4%/year.
$$\text{PV}_{B,\text{salary}} = \frac{95{,}000}{0.05 - 0.04}\left[1 - \left(\frac{1.04}{1.05}\right)^{40}\right] = 9{,}500{,}000 \cdot 0.3164 \approx \boxed{\$3.01\text{M}}$$
(b) Stock options via Black-Scholes: $S = \$125, K = \$100, \sigma = 40\%, T = 5$ (cliff vest), $r_f = 2\%$.
$$d_1 = \frac{\ln(125/100) + (0.02 + 0.16/2)\cdot 5}{0.4\sqrt{5}} = \frac{0.2231 + 0.50}{0.8944} = 0.8085$$
$$d_2 = 0.8085 - 0.8944 = -0.0859$$
$N(d_1) \approx 0.7906,\; N(d_2) \approx 0.4658$
$$C = 125\cdot 0.7906 - 100\cdot e^{-0.10}\cdot 0.4658 = 98.82 - 42.14 \approx \boxed{\$56.68/\text{option}}$$
Total BS value $= 2{,}000 \cdot \$56.68 = \$113{,}360$.
(c) A vs B with full BS: $\text{B}_{\text{total}} = \$3.01\text{M} + \$113\text{K} = \$3.12\text{M} > \text{A}_{\text{total}} = \$3.07\text{M} \Rightarrow$ prefer B.
(d) With ESO haircut 30–50%: true employee value $= 50\text{-}70\%$ of BS $\approx \$57\text{K}\text{-}\$79\text{K}$. B total becomes $\$3.07\text{M}\text{-}\$3.09\text{M}$ — roughly equal to A. Employee risk tolerance, diversification needs, and outlook on company stock now tip the decision.
Reference
Calculator tip: Programmable calculators are allowed. Pre-load: (i) annuity factor function, (ii) bond pricer, (iii) CAPM calculator, (iv) Black-Scholes with N(·) from a Taylor approximation. Practice inputting common values rapidly.
Practice Exam
Matches the length and structure of the actual Winter 2026 final. Budget 150 minutes total. Show formula setup on every part. Click "Show Answer" to reveal model solutions.
Professor Mott was shown two Honda plans. (i) Lease: 1% per month (compounded monthly), $15,000 loan, 3 years of monthly payments. (ii) Buy: 4% APR (compounded monthly), $25,000 loan, 5 years monthly. The sales associate said "the interest rate is lower on the lease, so obviously lease."
(a) Explain in plain English why Mott was not pleased. (b) Which is actually more expensive? (c) Monthly payment for each.
Model Answer
(a) The sales associate compared a per-month rate (1%) against a per-year rate (4%). That's an apples-to-oranges comparison. An honest comparison requires putting both rates on the same annual-compounded benchmark (EAR).
(b) $\text{EAR}_{\text{lease}} = (1.01)^{12} - 1 \approx 12.68\%$; $\text{EAR}_{\text{buy}} = (1 + 0.04/12)^{12} - 1 \approx 4.074\%$. The lease is roughly three times the buy's effective rate.
(c) Lease: $15{,}000 = \dfrac{C}{0.01}\left[1 - \dfrac{1}{(1.01)^{36}}\right] \Rightarrow C \approx \$498.21/\text{month}$. Buy: $25{,}000 = \dfrac{C}{0.04/12}\left[1 - \dfrac{1}{(1 + 0.04/12)^{60}}\right] \Rightarrow C \approx \$460.41/\text{month}$.
Remember: bond yields/coupons are quoted as semi-annual APRs.
(a) 22-year bond, \$1,000 face, coupon 7.35%, yield 5%. Value? (b) 10-year bond, \$1,000 face, coupon 1.2%, yield 4.55%. Value? (c) Relate both bonds' prices to face value using coupon rate vs YTM and TVM. (d) Firm paid \$3 dividend this year, historical return 6%, expected growth 1.6%, cost of equity 2%. Fair share price? (e) British consol pays \$40 semi-annually, yield 5%. Value? (f) Project costs \$100K; CFs grow at 5% for 10 years from \$30K; project in auto sector with elasticity 0.7; last year $r_f = 3\%, r_m = 10\%$, historical company return 6%. Should you invest?
Model Answer
(a) Semi-annual: $r = 2.5\%, C = \$36.75, T = 44$. $\text{PV}_C = \dfrac{36.75}{0.025}\left[1 - \dfrac{1}{(1.025)^{44}}\right] \approx \$975$; $\text{PV}_F = \dfrac{1000}{(1.025)^{44}} \approx \$337$. $\;\boxed{P \approx \$1{,}312}$ (premium).
(b) $r = 2.275\%, C = \$6.00, T = 20$. $\text{PV}_C \approx \$96$; $\text{PV}_F \approx \$637$. $\;\boxed{P \approx \$733}$ (discount).
(c) Bond (a) trades above face because coupon rate $(7.35\%) >$ YTM $(5\%)$ — it overpays relative to market rates, so investors bid up the price. Bond (b) trades below face because coupon rate $(1.2\%) <$ YTM $(4.55\%)$. In both cases the market adjusts price so the buyer earns exactly the YTM; TVM ensures $P \ne F$ unless coupon rate $=$ YTM.
(d) Gordon with $r = 2\%, g = 1.6\%$. $D_1 = 3(1.016) = \$3.048$. $\;P_0 = \dfrac{3.048}{0.02 - 0.016} = \boxed{\$762}$. (Historical return is a distractor — use cost of equity.)
(e) Semi-annual rate $= 2.5\%$. $\;P = \dfrac{40}{0.025} = \boxed{\$1{,}600}$.
(f) $\beta_{\text{proj}} = 0.7$. Hurdle $= 3\% + 0.7 \cdot (10\% - 3\%) = 7.9\%$. Growing annuity: $\text{PV} = \dfrac{30{,}000}{0.079 - 0.05}\left[1 - \left(\dfrac{1.05}{1.079}\right)^{10}\right] \approx \$240{,}880$. $\;\text{NPV} = -100{,}000 + 240{,}880 = \boxed{+\$140{,}880} > 0 \Rightarrow$ accept.
Company: historical stock return 4%, $r_f = 3\%$, MRP $= 6\%$, firm $\beta = 1$. Timber project: $\beta = 1.75$, CFs: $-\$10\text{M}, +\$2.75\text{M}, +\$4.5\text{M}, +\$5\text{M}$.
(a) NPV at 4% historical rate. (b) NPV using CAPM with firm beta. (c) NPV using project beta (correct). (d) Explain consequences of wrong discount rate.
Model Answer
(a) $r = 4\%$: $\text{NPV} = -10 + \dfrac{2.75}{1.04} + \dfrac{4.5}{1.04^2} + \dfrac{5}{1.04^3} \approx \boxed{+\$1.25\text{M}}$ → accept (but wrong rate).
(b) CAPM with firm beta ($\beta = 1$): $r = 3\% + 1\cdot 6\% = 9\%$. $\text{NPV} \approx \boxed{+\$0.17\text{M}}$ → barely accept.
(c) CAPM with project beta ($\beta = 1.75$): $r = 3\% + 1.75 \cdot 6\% = 13.5\%$. $\text{NPV} \approx \boxed{-\$0.66\text{M}}$ → reject.
(d) Using the wrong rate causes systematic misallocation of capital. Historical averages mix idiosyncratic shocks and may reflect a stale risk profile. Firm beta averages all divisions, so low-risk projects appear unprofitable (false negatives) and high-risk projects appear profitable (false positives). Only project-specific beta correctly prices the systematic risk of this project's cash flows. Timber is 75% more volatile than the market, requiring higher return than historical/firm averages suggest.
$r_0 = 10\%$, $E = \$1{,}000\text{M}$, $r_D = 5\%$, $\tau_c = 20\%$, $\text{EBIT} = \$100\text{M}/\text{year}$.
(a) Income statement at $D = 0$. (b) Income statement at $D = \$1{,}000\text{M}$; tax saved. (c) Maximum debt and income statement there. (d) $r_E$ and WACC at each level; pattern? (e) What is "optimal"? Why minimize WACC? Practical?
Model Answer
(a) Interest $= 0$; Taxable $= \$100\text{M}$; Tax $= \$20\text{M}$; Post-tax $= \boxed{\$80\text{M}}$.
(b) Interest $= \$50\text{M}$; Taxable $= \$50\text{M}$; Tax $= \$10\text{M}$; Post-tax $= \boxed{\$40\text{M}}$. Tax saved $= \$10\text{M}$ (shield $= \tau_c \cdot I = 0.2 \cdot \$50\text{M}$).
(c) Max debt when interest exhausts EBIT: $D_{\max} = \dfrac{\$100\text{M}}{0.05} = \boxed{\$2{,}000\text{M}}$. Interest $= \$100\text{M}$; Taxable $= 0$; Tax $= 0$; Post-tax $= 0$.
(d)
$D = 0$: $\;D/E = 0,\; r_E = 10\%,\; \text{WACC} = 10\%$.
$D = \$1{,}000\text{M}$: $\;D/E = 1,\; r_E = 10\% + 1\cdot(10\% - 5\%)\cdot 0.8 = \boxed{14\%}$, $\;\text{WACC} = 10\%\cdot[1 - (1000/2000)\cdot 0.2] = \boxed{9.0\%}$.
$D = \$2{,}000\text{M}$: $\;E \to 0,\; r_E \to \infty$, $\;\text{WACC} = 10\%\cdot[1 - (2000/3000)\cdot 0.2] = \boxed{8.67\%}$.
Pattern: $r_E$ rises with leverage; WACC falls monotonically thanks to the tax shield.
(e) Optimal in this model $=$ maximum debt (lowest WACC). Firms minimize WACC because $V = \sum \text{CF}/(1+\text{WACC})^t$. Not practical: ignores bankruptcy costs. At 100% debt the firm has no equity cushion and would be destroyed by the slightest cash-flow shock. Trade-off theory says optimum is where marginal tax shield $=$ marginal bankruptcy costs.
Age 25, $T = 40$ years, $r = 5\%$, $r_f = 2\%$. A: \$125K salary, 2.5% growth. B: \$95K salary, 4% growth, plus 2,000 ESOs (5-year cliff vest, $K = \$100$, $S_0 = \$125$, $\sigma = 40\%$).
(a) PV of lifetime salary for A vs B. (b) Accounting value of options (Black-Scholes). (c) Preference with BS value. (d) Apply 30-50% haircut for restrictions; which do you prefer?
Model Answer
(a) Growing annuity with $T = 40, r = 5\%$.
A: $\text{PV} = \dfrac{125{,}000}{0.05 - 0.025}\left[1 - \left(\dfrac{1.025}{1.05}\right)^{40}\right] = 5{,}000{,}000 \cdot 0.6131 \approx \boxed{\$3.07\text{M}}$.
B: $\text{PV} = \dfrac{95{,}000}{0.05 - 0.04}\left[1 - \left(\dfrac{1.04}{1.05}\right)^{40}\right] = 9{,}500{,}000 \cdot 0.3164 \approx \boxed{\$3.01\text{M}}$. A is slightly higher.
(b) Black-Scholes: $d_1 = \dfrac{\ln(125/100) + (0.02 + 0.5\cdot 0.16)\cdot 5}{0.4\sqrt{5}} \approx 0.808$; $d_2 = 0.808 - 0.894 = -0.086$. $N(d_1) \approx 0.791$, $N(d_2) \approx 0.466$. $C = 125 \cdot 0.791 - 100\cdot e^{-0.1} \cdot 0.466 \approx \boxed{\$56.70/\text{option}}$. Total $= 2000 \cdot 56.70 = \$113{,}400$.
(c) $\text{B}_{\text{total}} = \$3.01\text{M} + \$113\text{K} = \$3.12\text{M} > \$3.07\text{M} \Rightarrow$ prefer B.
(d) 30–50% haircut: true ESO value to employee $= 50\text{-}70\%$ of BS $= \$57\text{K}\text{-}\$79\text{K}$. B total $= \$3.07\text{M}\text{-}\$3.09\text{M}$. Roughly tied with A; decision shifts to non-financial factors: risk tolerance, job stability, culture, stock outlook. Risk-averse graduate prefers A (certain cash); bullish graduate still prefers B. Haircut reflects that non-tradable, forfeit-if-you-leave options are worth less to a diversification-constrained employee than to the grantor.
$S_0 = \$50$, $\pm 20\%$ per year, $r = 3\%$ continuous, $K = \$45$, $T = 2$ years. Call option.
(a) Year-2 payoffs. (b) $C_u$ via up-state one-period tree. (c) $C_d$ via down-state tree. (d) Collapse to $t = 0$, find $C_0$.
Model Answer
(a) $C_{uu} = \max(72-45, 0) = \$27$; $\;C_{ud} = \max(48-45, 0) = \$3$; $\;C_{dd} = \max(32-45, 0) = \$0$.
(b) Up state, $S_u = 60$: $\;q = \dfrac{e^{0.03}\cdot 60 - 48}{72 - 48} = \dfrac{13.827}{24} = 0.5761$. $\;C_u = e^{-0.03}[0.5761\cdot 27 + 0.4239\cdot 3] = 0.9704 \cdot 16.826 = \boxed{\$16.33}$.
(c) Down state, $S_d = 40$: $\;q = \dfrac{e^{0.03}\cdot 40 - 32}{48 - 32} = \dfrac{9.218}{16} = 0.5761$. $\;C_d = e^{-0.03}[0.5761\cdot 3 + 0.4239\cdot 0] = 0.9704 \cdot 1.728 = \boxed{\$1.68}$.
(d) Collapsed to $t=0$: $\;q = \dfrac{e^{0.03}\cdot 50 - 40}{60 - 40} = \dfrac{11.523}{20} = 0.5761$. $\;C_0 = e^{-0.03}[0.5761\cdot 16.33 + 0.4239\cdot 1.68] = 0.9704 \cdot 10.119 = \boxed{\$9.82}$.
Note: $q$ is identical at every node because $u$ and $d$ factors are constant; $q$ depends only on $u, d, r\Delta t$.
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